Both the United States and Iran want to end the war and have strong incentives to reach an agreement, but the final deal outlined in the memorandum will not happen—not in 60 days, not in a year. The structure isn’t sound; the ambiguities in the text are unbridgeable gaps between the U.S. and Iranian positions, and it is weighed down by commitments from other actors—Israel, the Arab Gulf states, Hezbollah, and Congress—that were not party to the negotiations.

It may fail on its first condition, a ceasefire that extends to Lebanon. Israel has not agreed to end any part of its war with Iran and its regional partners, and Netanyahu said Thursday that Israeli forces will continue to occupy southern Lebanon, continuing a conflict that he has argued is essential for Israel’s security and that remains popular with the Israeli public.

The more the United States demands that Netanyahu accede to the terms it has set, the more incentive he has to continue the conflict to demonstrate his policy independence—especially as he prepares for elections later this year. Even before the agreement was announced, critics to his right and left were already using the negotiations and Netanyahu’s relationship with Trump as a political cudgel. Netanyahu is signaling that he will not accept the agreement, and has already demonstrated that he is willing to violate ceasefires even if it means risking more Iranian missile and drone strikes.

There is also the issue of the $300 billion reconstruction fund that is unlikely to find donors. If a final deal is contingent on this pot of money being filled by the United States and its “regional partners,” it will never be signed.